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The principal goal of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 is to
open the market for local telephone service to competition. So far,
however, the statute has attracted headlines more for generating legal
controversy than for creating economic competition. The disputes
that have commanded such attention and colored public discussion of
the Act involve, at their core, the Federal Communications
Commission's interpretation of provisions requiring incumbent local
carriers to make parts of their proprietary networks available for use
by new entrants. While some observers blame litigation and non-
compliance with these "network unbundling" provisions for delaying
implementation of a generally sound piece of legislation,' others
contend either that the FCC's implementation of the unbundling
requirements is impermissible and onerous or that regulators have
not gone far enough to help new competitors.2
Given the resources devoted to disputes over the Act, it would
be easy to suppose, as a variety of commentators have,3 that the
success of the 1996 Act depends on how courts and regulators resolve
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1. See, e.g., Merging Telecom Companies Seek to Mollify Congressional Concerns,
COMMUNICATIONS TODAY, June 25, 1998; More Skirmishing on the Section 271 Front,
COMMUNICATIONS TODAY, April 16,1998.
2. See Peter Elstrom, Special Report, Industry Outlook 1999: Information, BUSINESS
WEEK, Jan. 11, 1999; USTA Says Local Markets are Competitive; Calls for Further
Reforms, THE WHITE HOUSE BULLETIN, Dec. 10,1998.
3. See Debra Wayne, The Terrible Twos of the Telecom Act, RADIO COMM. REPORT,
Feb. 2,1998, at 8.
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the detailed unbundling issues at the center of those disputes.
Unbundling in some form is undoubtedly important for creating
competition in certain markets. But to tie the Act's significance to
implementation of the unbundling provisions is to undervalue two
provisions of the statute that establish fundamental conditions for
competition: (1) the preemption of state and local laws that create
barriers to entry into local markets, and (2) the requirement that rival
local networks interconnect to exchange traffic so that customers of
one telephone network can call customers of another. Those two
parts of the Act are responsible for transforming the regulatory
structure of local telecommunications from one that protected
monopoly franchises to one that invites competition.
This essay will first compare how different provisions of the 1996
Act affect the transition to competition in local exchange markets. It
will then examine the importance of the Act's monopoly preemption
and network interconnection requirements in light of the historical
development of local telephone monopolies. Finally, it will discuss
the empirical effect those provisions have had to date on competition
in local exchange markets.
I. Necessary and Other Conditions for Local Telephone
Competition
The 1996 Act brought fundamental reform to the legal
environment of local telecommunications through two categories of
provisions: those establishing necessary conditions for entry into the
local exchange market and those facilitating and fostering such entry.
The Act's monopoly preemption and interconnection provisions are
in the first category. Without them, even a would-be competitor that
built its own network could not enter the local exchange market. The
unbundling and resale rules, in contrast, fit into the second category
of rules that facilitate competition. Although a new carrier with its
own facilities does not need unbundled elements or the ability to
resell the incumbent's service, those options reduce entry costs by
allowing other carriers to participate in the market without first
investing in the physical infrastructure necessary to provide service.
Before passage of the 1996 Act, an entrepreneur who sunk new
cables, strung new wires, and installed new switches in a franchise
area would at best have had only limited uses for those assets.
Offering local telephone service to the general public would not have
been among them. Local telephone service throughout the United
States had for decades been provided almost entirely by franchise
monopolies under the jurisdiction of state public utility commissions.
The economics of natural monopoly, preservation of cross-subsidies
that support universal-service goals, and the ability of regulators to
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ensure network development were cited to justify the exclusion of
competition from local-service markets.4
The 1996 Act swept away those justifications and dismantled the
entrenched system of state-sanctioned monopolies. Section 253 of the
Act removes barriers to competitive entry into local exchange
markets created by state and local laws.5 That provision broadly
strikes down existing state grants of monopoly franchises: "No State
or local statute or regulation, or other State or local legal
requirement, may prohibit or have the effect of prohibiting the ability
of any entity to provide interstate or intrastate telecommunications
service."' 6 The statute moreover gives the FCC continuing authority to
preempt any contrary actions that a state or locality takes after
passage of the Act.7  These provisions radically changed the
regulatory environment and uprooted a legal and administrative
structure that had evolved over decades. A rule of protected
monopoly gave way to a rule of open competition.
Removal of legal barriers to entry into local markets, while
necessary, will in most cases not suffice to allow local exchange
competition. The size of the incumbents' networks and the high value
consumers place on being connected to every other person with a
phone also create an economic barrier for new entrants. Even if a
new carrier built a complete, state-of-the-art network, it would have
trouble attracting new customers if it could not promise them that,
upon switching, they could still call all the people they could call
when they subscribed to the incumbent's service. Accordingly, the
Act's mandate that telecommunications companies "interconnect" to
exchange traffic moving between customers on their respective
systems supplies the second condition necessary for competitive entry
in local telecommunications.8 The interconnection provisions require
a telecommunications carrier to link its network with another
carrier's facilities for purposes of exchanging telephone traffic,9 to do
so on nondiscriminatory terms of price and quality,10 and to forbear
from installing equipment or network features that violate standards
necessary for different networks to be interoperable.
The foregoing rules prevent one network from putting
competitors at an immediate competitive disadvantage by refusing to
4. See, e.g., PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 539-
50 (2d ed. 1999); THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER, Telecommunications Law and Policy 349-
52 (2d ed. 1997).
5. See 47 U.S.C. § 253.
6. Id. § 253(a).
7. See id. § 253(d).
8. See id. §§ 251(a), 251(c)(2).
9. See id. § 251(a)(1).
10. See id. §§ 251(c)(2)(C)-(D).
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pass traffic between its customers and a competitor's customers, and
thereby narrowing the scope of service new entrants can offer. It is
important to note that interconnection neither frees entrants from the
costs of building facilities in areas they serve nor confers on them an
advantage over incumbents or other carriers. Interconnection simply
allows a new entrant to offer customers the same benefit-connection
to anyone else who has a phone-that the incumbent offers. In that
regard, interconnection is an economic necessity for local telephone
competition. A new network that did not promise the same access to
others that the incumbent offered would be of much lower value to
consumers regardless of the entrant's price or quality of service. The
larger "network benefit" enjoyed by customers of the incumbent
would pose a virtually insurmountable economic barrier to entry for
new competitors.
A. The Unbundling and Resale Provisions Distinguished
The 1996 Act's resale and unbundling provisions differ
significantly from the law's preemption and interconnection
requirements. Whereas the latter remove legal and economic barriers
that would effectively keep competitors from entering the market, the
former try to increase the number of carriers that will enter once
those barriers are removed. They do so, in theory, by making the
accumulated advantages of incumbency accessible to all upon
compensation of the incumbent's costs of sharing its network and
services. Two statutory options allow a firm to enter the local market
without building many, or indeed any, of its own facilities: (1) resale
of the incumbents' services and (2) use of the incumbents' facilities
and equipment-"network elements"--to provide services to
customers."
With respect to resale, sections 251(b)(1) and 251(c)(4) require
incumbent local exchange companies to sell their services in bulk and
at wholesale prices to companies that will, in turn, resell those
services under another brand name to consumers. The wholesale
price is to be determined based on the retail price less the costs (e.g.
of billing and marketing) the incumbent will avoid by not dealing with
the retail customer.'2 These resale provisions allow carriers that
provide some telecommunications services, for example long-distance
and/or mobile calling, to offer consumers a product bundle that
includes local service without having to incur the costs of a building or
acquiring facilities. They also might allow a company to develop the
customer relationships necessary to compete successfully before
11. See id §§251(c)(3)-(4).
12. See id. § 252(d)(3).
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undertaking the financial risk of constructing its own network.
Section 251(c)(3) of the Act allows competitors to use elements
of the incumbent network in combination with their own facilities to
provide service. That provision requires incumbent local carriers to
provide competitors or other telecommunications carriers with access
to network elements on an unbundled (i.e., standalone) basis, at any
technically feasible point, on nondiscriminatory and "reasonable"
terms. Moreover, an incumbent local carrier must provide unbundled
network elements in a manner that allows requesting carriers to
combine them for the purposes of providing a telecommunications
service. 13
The Act defines an "element" as any facility or equipment used
to provide a telecommunications service, including any functions,
features, or capabilities of the facilities or equipment.14 The most
prominent network element, and the one that is most difficult for a
new entrant to construct for itself, is the customer "loop," the line
between a household and a phone company's central office, where its
switches are located. Incumbent firms must allow new competitors to
lease those loops and the switches (computers that route telephone
calls) necessary to provide service over those loops. In essence,
incumbents must allow access to the elements of their networks which
are necessary15 to provide competing service, and must do so "based
on cost" of providing the facility or equipment. 16
Although the preemption and basic interconnection rules have
caused the greatest changes in the legal structure of local
telecommunications regulation, the FCC's unbundling and resale
rules (including the associated pricing rules) have generated the most
controversy. This is not surprising. It is one thing to tell incumbent
firms that competitors will be allowed into their markets; it is another
issue altogether to tell them that they must cooperate, against their
interests and for little if any profit, with those very competitors. As a
legal matter, given that preemption of state monopoly protections is
clearly within Congress' constitutional commerce power, there was
little to challenge in that provision once the legislative battle ended.
Interconnection is similarly difficult to challenge on its face. So long
as carriers receive adequate compensation for the required use of
their facilities and equipment, interconnection, too, is a
constitutionally valid exercise of congressional power.
Of course, specific aspects of interconnection, such as how it
13. See id § 251(c)(3).
14. See id. § 153(a)(29).
15. See infra text accompanying note 13 for a more precise statement of the
unbundling standard.
16. See 47 U.S.C. § 252(d)(1)(A)(i).
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should be priced and where in the network it should occur, may give
rise to dispute. For example, the Act requires local carriers to
establish "reciprocal compensation arrangements for the transport
and termination of telecommunications."' 17 However, the Act fails to
specify how to structure such compensation, how to set the rates, or
how to address potential problems of asymmetric traffic. Whether
interconnection is handled in a particular case by voluntary
negotiation or by regulation, its resolution can therefore be difficult
and contentious. But the interconnection requirement itself is less
controversial, and promises more mutual benefit between carriers,
than either unbundling or resale.
Unbundling on its face probably poses no greater constitutional
questions than does interconnection. But it does involve an
additional layer of administrative decision-making that has caused
substantial conflict within the industry. Much of this conflict involves
the vague "necessary and impair" standard the FCC must apply to
determine whether incumbents must unbundle a given network
element, and the cost-based standard it must apply in setting prices
for those elements. Under that standard, the Commission must
determine whether "access to proprietary elements is necessary, and
whether the failure to obtain access to nonproprietary elements
would impair the ability to provide services.' 8 Challenges to the
FCC's orders implementing the Act's unbundling and resale
provisions have arisen in a variety of forums. Administrative
proceedings have taken place at the FCC.19 Constitutional and
administrative challenges have been brought in federal district
court.20 And numerous disputes over pricing have been fought before
state utility commissions.21 The pivotal case stemming from the 1996
Act is Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC, 2 which went two rounds in the
Eighth Circuit before the Supreme Court decided it at the end of
1998. The case arose after several States and private entities filed
separate petitions in various federal circuits to review the FCC's
17. Id. §2Z51(b)(5).
18. AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 119 S.Ct. 721,735 (1998).
19. See, e.g., In Re Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 FCC
Record 19392 (1996).
20. See, e.g., MCI Telecoms. Corp. v. BellSouth Telecoms. Corp., No. 97-76, 1999 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 2775 (E.D. KY 1999); SBC Communications v. FCC, 981 F. Supp. 996 (N.D.
TX 1997), rev'd 154 F.3d 226 (5th Cir. 1998), and cerL denied 119 S.Ct. 889 (1999).
21. The list of such proceedings is enormous. A prominent recent example of state
regulatory decisions implementing the local competition provisions of the 1996 Act is that
announced by the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission on August 26, 1999. See
Pennsylvania PUC Passes Rules to Jumpstart Local Competition, PR Newswire, Aug. 16,
1999.
22. 119 S.Ct. 721 (1998).
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massive local competition order of August 8, 199633
The challenges to the FCC's order fell into two principal
categories: jurisdictional disputes over the Commission's authority to
make certain rules, and substantive challenges to the rules
themselves. On the jurisdictional side, petitioners argued that the
FCC did not have authority to promulgate rules on pricing of
elements, wholesale services, and interconnection because the Act
reserved those functions for the States. 24 On the substantive side, the
parties challenged, among other things, the number of elements the
FCC required incumbent carriers to provide on an unbundled basis,
the method for setting prices of those elements, and the method for
setting prices of service purchased at wholesale pursuant to the Act's
resale provisions.25
The Supreme Court vacated the FCC's rule on the scope of
required unbundling and remanded the issue to the agency for
reconsideration. 26  The Court ruled that the Commission had
misinterpreted the statutory "necessary and impair" standard for
unbundling. At this writing, the Commission has just completed its
proceedings on remand and adopted a new unbundling order. That
order in some ways goes farther, but in other ways retreats, from the
original order 2 7 Whether or not the FCC's remand order is
challenged, unbundling will remain a live dispute as the details of the
order's implementation are worked out.
There also remains active controversy over how network
elements will be priced. Although the Supreme Court upheld the
Commission's jurisdiction to set pricing rules for network elements
and wholesale services, it remanded the issue of whether those rules
comply with the Act's substantive requirements to the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eight Circuit. That case was recently argued and, at
this writing, the Eighth Circuit has yet to issue its decision.
As regulations governing access to network elements and resale
have been challenged and reviewed, the interconnection and
preemption provisions of the Act have been in continuous force and
local competition has begun to develop. To appreciate the
importance of those provisions to competition, it is helpful to look at
both the historical evolution of local exchange markets and recent
23. The cases were consolidated and assigned by lottery to the Eighth Circuit.
24. See AT&T v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 119 S. Ct. 721,728 (1999).
25. See id.; Iowa Utilities Bd. v. FCC, 109 F.3d 418, 422 (8th Cir. 1996) (opinion
granting stay of FCC's competition order); Iowa Utilities Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753 (8th
Cir. 1997) (final opinion vacating relevant portions of the FCC's competition order and
vacating pricing rules).
26. See 119 S. Ct. at 737-38.
27. FCC Promotes Local Telecommunications Competition: Adopts Rules on
Unbundling of Network Elements, FCC NEwS, September 15, 1999.
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empirical developments since the 1996 Act.
H. The Development of Local Monopoly
The historical movement of local exchange markets from
competition to monopoly in the first decades of the twentieth century
highlights the current importance of the 1996 Act's monopoly-
preemption and interconnection provisions. In the early years of
telephony, rival telephone companies in the same service area failed
to interconnect their networks. This section will discuss how that
failure led to the demise of competition among local exchange
carriers and, more briefly, how the rise of monopoly franchises for
local telephone service followed as a direct result.
A. Early Competition for Local Customers
Although local telephone monopolies came to be taken for
granted, the early history of telephony strongly suggests that
monopoly was not economically inevitable. When AT&T's exclusive
hold on the Bell patents expired in 1893-94, numerous independent
companies entered the telephone business. Telephony spread
rapidly. The number of Americans with telephones more than
doubled in five years and, by 1920, more than one-third of all
households had service.28 New, independent (of the Bell System)
carriers garnered much of the expanding telephone traffic. Part of
the entrants' success came from serving markets ignored by AT&T.
AT&T had been pursuing high-volume, business-generated traffic by
connecting first the largest cities and then branching out to smaller
ones.29 As a result, in 1894 only three percent of the Bell system's
subscribers were in rural areas, even though sixty-two percent of
Americans at the time lived in communities defined as rural.30 Small
independent phone companies, farming organizations, and rural
cooperatives availed themselves of these unreached markets and
established thousands of local exchanges in rural areas.31
As AT&T extended its network from the biggest cities to smaller
population centers, the independent systems moved from rural areas
towards urban centers. The independents-many of whom had
joined in coalition-accumulated enough customers in the urban
periphery to make access to their systems valuable to the urban
28. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, Pt. 2, at 784
(Bicentennial Edition 1975) [hereinafter HISTORICAL STATISTICS].
29. Milton Mtreller, Universal Service in Telephone History, 17 TELECOMM. POLICY
352, 357 (1993).
30. See id. at 356.
31. See id at 360.
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customers targeted by AT&T. The dense population centers that
AT&T sought to monopolize became contested ground.
During the first two decades of the twentieth century, AT&T and
the independents eventually invaded each others' territories to the
point that over half of the U.S. population could choose between rival
local telephone carriers.32 In some areas the Bell company, not the
independent carrier, was the newer market entrant. Available data
show that traffic was about equally divided between AT&T and the
independent carriers by 1908, when the Bell system carried an
average of 16,029,000 conversations per day while independents
together carried 15,956,000. 3 At least by this measure, the market
share of competitive carriers had gone from zero to nearly fifty
percent in only fifteen years.
(1) The Question of Interconnection
There was, however, an inherent instability in the way local
telephone competition had developed. In general, customers of
independent carriers and customers of AT&T could not call each
other because the competing networks did not interconnect to
exchange customers' local calls. When phones were relatively rare
and the bulk of one's calls went to one or a few parties whose service
decisions could be coordinated, the fact that customers could only call
those people served by the same carrier may have been only a modest
inconvenience. But as the telephone became a more basic and
ubiquitous tool for business and personal communication, people
increasingly came to value not just connections between parties in
regular contact who could coordinate to be on the same network, but
also, in the words of AT&T President Vail, "communication with
some other one, who, until the particular necessity arose, might have
been unknown and unthought of."34 Implicit in Vail's observation was
the idea that, as more people can be reached through a given
communications system, the more valuable that system becomes to
any individual consumer. Competition pulling subscribers to
different systems undermined this customer-side economy of scale.
Vail's basic argument, while grounds for increasing the number
of telephones any given subscriber could reach, did not necessarily
support monopoly. Mandatory interconnection of competing
networks could have accomplished the same goal. The precedent for
such a mandate was mixed, however. The Post Roads Act of 186635
32. See id. at 359.
33. See HisroRIcAL STATISTICS, supra note 28, at 783.
34. Mueller, supra note 29, at 364 (quoting THEODORE VAIL, 1910 AT&T ANNUAL
REPORT 39).
35. Post Roads Act, Ch. 230, 14 Stat 221 (1866), repealed by Act of July 16, 1947, ch.
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required interconnection among competing or non-overlapping
telegraph systems,36 but neither the statute nor its underlying
principle extended to common carriers generally. Indeed, the
Supreme Court made clear in the 1886 Express Cases that common
carriage did not generally encompass the traffic of other carriers-in
the Court's words, that there was no obligation to be a "common
carrier of common carriers." 37 When the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910
deemed telephone companies to be common carriers, it did not
specifically impose on them any interconnection obligations towards
other phone companies and thus left them to be governed by the
more general Express Cases precedent.
Although the Bell companies and independents could have
chosen to interconnect, they did not. Perhaps each side hoped that by
standing its ground, it would eventually gain an edge that would make
its network the most valuable to subscribers and push the competing
network out of business. But the impetus for refusing
interconnection likely came from AT&T, which was comparatively
well situated to exert its financial might38 to pursue dominance of the
telephone market. AT&T was greatly helped in this quest by its
acquisition of the patents for amplification technology that vastly
improved long-distance service. With its new ability to offer better
service, AT&T began to recover market share lost to independents
since the expiration of the original telephone patents in the early
1890's. 39 Just as rival telephone carriers did not interconnect their
local networks, AT&T refused to allow independents to interconnect
to this improved long-lines network. Customers who desired AT&T's
long-distance service thus had incentive to choose AT&T for local
service. Because the independents could neither connect their
customers to AT&T's long-distance services nor purchase the
256, 61 Stat. 327.
36. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 129 N.E. 220, 222 (1920)
("Each [telegraph carrier] represents the public when applying to the other for service and
no discrimination can be made by either against the other, but each must render to the
other the same services it renders to the rest of the community under the same
conditions.").
37. Memphis and Little Rock R.R. Co. v. Southern Express Co., 117 U.S. 1, 21 (1886)
(Express Cases).
38. In 1916, when relevant data for independents first became available, independent
companies' combined book value was just over a quarter billion dollars while AT&T's was
nearly $1 billion, independents' profits were just under $10 million while AT&T's were
over $50 million, and independent networks contained roughly 4 million miles of wire
while AT&T's had about 20 million miles. See HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 28, at
785,787.
39. See Roger G. Noll and Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation:
United States v. AT&T, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 290,291 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. &
Lawrence J. White eds., 1989) [hereinafter Anticompetitive Uses].
1626 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 50
COMPETITION AND CONTROVERSY
necessary equipment from AT&T to provide such service themselves,
many either merged into the Bell system or went out of business.
40
As the Bell system acquired rivals, accumulated market share,
and refused to interconnect either its local or long-distance networks
with competitors, the enterprise not surprisingly attracted the trust-
busting zeal of the times. The U.S. Department of Justice filed an
antitrust suit against AT&T in 1913 alleging that AT&T had
improperly leveraged its dominance in the long-distance market to
force competing local carriers into closing or merging with the Bell
System.
Ultimately, in what has come to be called the "Kingsbury
Commitment" (for the AT&T Vice President who negotiated with
the government), the parties settled in 1914 on terms that proved
enormously favorable for the Bell System. In return for the
government's dropping the case, AT&T promised to submit to a
degree of regulatory oversight, to cease acquiring independent
competitors, and to interconnect all surviving competitors to AT&T's
long-distance network. 41 The Kingsbury Commitment contained
numerous other provisions, such as AT&T's divestiture of Western
Union, that gave the agreement an appearance of substance. But it
also contained built-in flexibility that ultimately undermined some of
the settlement's central features, such as the non-acquisition
provision. By time the government's case was settled, AT&T had
secured its dominance and avoided action that would have slowed its
growth or reintroduced viable competition.
If the Kingsbury Commitment was intended to preserve local
competition from further erosion by prohibiting AT&T from
acquiring additional local companies, it was destined to fail from the
outset. Because the settlement required Bell to interconnect
independents to its long-distance network, but not to its local system,
existing competition was left in a precarious position. Subscribers to
competing systems still found themselves unable to call people on
AT&T's local networks, and vice versa. This inherent inefficiency
burdened consumers. And to reduce that burden, federal authorities
began to allow consolidation of competing carriers. The Department
of Justice approved most of AT&T's special applications to acquire
local companies in the years the consent decree was in force.42 And,
in 1918, Congress and the President gave the Postmaster General
emergency powers over the phone system which led to further
consolidations.43 Finally, in 1921 Congress permanently suspended
40. See HUBER, supra note 4.
41. See Anticompetitive Uses, supra note 39, at 293.
42. See HUBER, supra note 4, at 27 and n.113.
43. See id.
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the non-acquisition provisions of the Kingsbury Commitment and
gave the Interstate Commerce Commission authority to exempt
telephone company mergers from the antitrust laws.44 The resulting
statute, the Willis-Graham Act, was expressly aimed at eliminating
the inefficient fragmentation of the phone system.45
On its face, the Willis-Graham Act did not create an open season
for acquisitions. The Act only withheld antitrust enforcement for
consolidations that were "of advantage to the persons to whom
service is to be rendered and in the public interest."46 In practice,
however, the hurdle proved a low one and competing local telephone
service fell into rapid demise.47 An important effect of the Willis-
Graham Act was to link the Bell system's conduct to concepts of
public service, leading in time to a system of regulated monopoly
franchises. This transition has its roots in the rationale for
consolidations permitted under the Kingsbury Commitment and the
brief period of Postmaster control. The consumer benefit ascribed to
consolidation was connection to the whole universe of other
telephone subscribers without subscribing to multiple service
providers. From this emphasis on consumer benefits arose the more
general public policy goal of increasing the spread of telephony by
ensuring that telephone service was affordable to all Americans.
Monopoly franchising thus became increasingly entrenched in state
and federal regulatory policy. As one lively commentary puts it,
regulators aimed to put "a telephone within arm's reach of the
chicken in every pot."4
Although a full discussion of the rise of monopoly franchises and
the division of regulatory jurisdiction over local services is beyond the
scope of this essay, the development of a system of implicit subsidies
to keep residential rates low was an important part of the story. That
system developed over time in a manner that made competition and
entry into the local exchange market incompatible with public
policies pursued mostly at the state level. For example, regulators
favored the averaging of rates between urban (low cost) and rural
(high cost) customers so that no one would pay too high a price for
local service.49 New entrants were blocked from the market under the
theory that they would have incentive to "cherry pick" the high-
revenue/low cost customers, leaving the less desirable customers to
44. See Willis-Graham Act, ch.20, 42 Stat. 27 (1921) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C.
§ 221(a), repealed by § 601(b)(2), 110 Stat. 143).
45. 47 U.S.C. § 221(a).
46. Id.
47. See HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 28, at 783.
48. HUBER, supra note 4, at 21.
49. See THOMAS G. KRATrENMAKER, TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY
349 (2d ed. 1997).
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the incumbent and simultaneously eroding the incumbent's revenue
base.50 The result was a system of regulated monopolies that
persisted until Congress adopted section 253 of the 1996 Act and
abruptly eliminated state-created barriers to entry into local exchange
markets.
I1. Empirical Evidence of Local Competition
The discussion above demonstrates two things: that monopoly
franchising became deeply entrenched in telecommunications policy,
and that it did so in large part to pursue efficiencies and network
benefits that could have been accomplished by interconnection. Had
the latter been required in the first decades of the century, the system
of franchised territories might never have developed. History thus
shows preemption and interconnection to be indispensable conditions
for a competitive market in local telecommunications. This section
reinforces that historical lesson by examining the current empirical
effect of the 1996 Act's preemption and interconnection provisions.
Limited entry into the local telephone market began several
years before the 1996 Act. Most early entrants competed with the
incumbents only in providing business customers with connections to
long-distance carriers, a service known as "competitive access."
Competitive access providers offered bypass of the local network for
long-distance calls-not an alternative system for local calls between
customers-as early as 1994,51 but little competing service was
actually offered. A carrier must obtain a "numbering code" for each
switch it wants to use to provide local exchange service.52 Only 15
such codes had been issued to competitive entrants by the end of
1994.53
After the 1996 Act and its market-opening provisions became
law, new local carriers began to acquire necessary authorizations to
provide local exchange service. Within one year of the date Congress
passed the Act, over 150 numbering codes had been obtained by
enterprises planning to offer competing service.54 Three years after
passage of the Act, that figure stood at over 450.55 To be sure, paper
authorizations do not necessarily translate into physical facilities. But
by the latter measure, too, the 1996 Act sparked substantial change.
50. Id. at 352.
51. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, INDUSTRY ANALYSIS DIVISION,
LOCAL COMPETITION 55 (1998).
52. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, INDUSTRY ANALYSIS DIVISION,
LOCAL COMPETITION 43 (Aug. 1999).




For example, the number of switches owned by competitive local
carriers, which stood at only sixty-five when Congress passed the Act
in 1996, grew to nearly seven hundred by the end of 1998.56 With
these switches, competitors could direct customers' calls not only past
the local exchange to the long-distance network, but between
customers within the exchange itself-true local telephone service.
Of course, the most significant evidence of local competition lies
in actual service offerings to customers. The data on acquisition of
customers by local competitors show that entry since passage of the
Act has focused principally on full-service, local telephony for urban
businesses.5 7 Residential local service has seen some competitive
entry but has not developed in a manner comparable to business
service.5 8 The 1996 Act has also spurred entry by firms providing
high-speed data services to local exchage customers over unbundled
loops leased from the incumbent carriers. It is estimated that
competing carriers providing local service over their own facilities,
through resale, and through use of the incumbent's unbundled
network elements have captured about three percent of local lines
from the incumbent local providers.59 Because competitors have
focused on serving the largest and most profitable customers first, the
business they have won represents about six percent of the local
services market measured by revenues. 6° Recent data compiled from
publicly-traded competitive local exchange carriers show them to be
gaining between 600,000 and 700,000 customer lines per quarter,
mostly from business customers.61 Although these figures purport to
capture only true local exchange lines, they may be somewhat
inflated, perhaps by inclusion of special access lines or by counting
branch extensions from a single business line as separate lines. But
even with that caveat, the competitive companies' quarterly line
acquisition is substantial and may be even higher than reported given
that the above numbers do not include the customers of non-public
firms.
The data discussed above aggregates different forms of
competitive local-exchange service-i.e. service through resale,
unbundled elements, and the entrants' own facilities. The paradigm
case of entry is competition by a firm that builds its own facilities to
rival incumbents in a given market. For example, when Southwest
56. See generally id.
57. See id. at 5.
58. See id.; see also id. tbl. 3.2 (showing that even resellers served more business that
residential customers.).
59. See MERRILL LYNCH, CLEC VITAL SIGNS: UPDATE FOR 2Q99 RESULTS AND
TRENDS, tbl. 8 (1999).
60. See id.
61. See id.
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Airlines went into business, it obtained its own planes, landing slots,
and support facilities, and put them into service against the
established air carriers. Similarly, MCI entered the long-distance
telephone business by constructing its own microwave transmission
facilities.62  And, when competitive access providers began to
compete against local exchange incumbents to connect customers to
long-distance telephone networks, they did so over their own fiber
lines and electronics. The 1996 Act goes beyond the paradigm case of
entry and creates opportunities for competitors to participate in the
local market even without investing in their own facilities, either by
reselling an incumbent provider's services or by using all or part of an
incumbent's facilities. For purposes of examining the effects of the
monopoly preemption and interconnection requirements on local
competition, this section focuses on entry by firms using their own
facilities.
A. Facilities-Based Entry
Although many of the 1996 Act's local competition provisions
address competitors' access to incumbent carriers' networks and
services, such provisions are irrelevant to a sizable proportion of local
competition. Data from publicly traded local competitors show that
they collectively serve nearly one-third of their customers entirely
over their own facilities,63 a share that has been growing.64 As new
entrants continue to build their systems, the growth of such facilities-
based service will likely accelerate. Several sources of data, albeit
sketchy and incomplete, show competitive local carriers to be
building out their networks at a fast clip. Merrill Lynch estimates
from its survey of public local companies that those competitors have
recently been adding over 50,000 route-miles of fiber line to their
networks every quarter and that the rate of fiber deployment has
been increasing.6 5 FCC data show the amount of fiber cable deployed
by new entrants to have tripled from 1993 to 1997, with particularly
rapid deployment from 1994 to 1997.66 The more physical
infrastructure the competing carriers have, the less they need to
obtain from incumbents, and the more customers they can serve on
their own networks.
The strategy some major long-distance carriers are pursuing in
62. See HUBER, supra note 4, at 38.
63. See MERRILL LYNCH, supra note 59, at 12; JP MORGAN, COMPETITIVE TELECOM
SERVICES REVIEW, at 9 (Sept. 1999).
64. See JP MORGAN, supra note 63, at 8.
65. See MERRILL LYNCH, supra note 59, at 8.
66. See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, FCC FIBER DEPLOYMENT DATA
- END OF YEAR 1997 at 40 (1998).
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the local exchange market reflects the importance of facilities-based
entry for local competition. AT&T, for example, initially sought to
compete through resale or use of the incumbents' unbundled
elements. The company filed regulatory applications to provide local
service nationwide and by the end of 1998 had been certified to do so
in forty-five states.67 It received final decisions on interconnection
arbitrations from twenty-five state regulatory agencies and has signed
numerous interconnection agreements.68 AT&T's actual local service
offerings through resale or unbundling have, however, been
extremely modest. The company offers local residential service in
only a few small and mid-sized markets.69 Its business offerings are
somewhat broader, but are limited to the densest commercial
markets.
AT&T recently radically changed its strategy to pursue full,
facilities-based competition through existing cable networks.
AT&T's acquisition of TCI, one of the largest multi-system cable
operators, was approved in early 1999 and immediately gave AT&T
the ability to have a direct wire into tens of millions of households.
The company has announced plans to upgrade the plant to two-way
capability and begin offering broadband and voice services to most of
those households within a few years. AT&T is trying to expand the
reach of this strategy by purchasing additional cable operators, 70 and
by forging alliances with others.71 A variety of reasons have been
offered for AT&T's change in strategy. Some attribute the carrier's
abandonment of large-scale resale and use of unbundled elements to
being "fed up with the Baby Bells' refusal to let [it] into local
markets." 72  More likely, AT&T perceived the need to meet the
rapidly changing telecommunications markets by developing a system
capable not only of conventional voice service, but of high-speed data
services and video as well. Conventional phone lines are limited in
their broadband capabilities and AT&T's strategy perhaps fit better
with entry through cable systems. But whether technology or legal
disputes spurred AT&T's decision to enter the market through its
67. See AT&T Local Service Overview (last modified March 20, 1997)
<http:lwww.ATT.comlpublicpolicylupdate.html.>
68. See id
69. See AT&T Local Service Overview, supra note 52. AT&T offers residential service
in Rochester, NY, Grand Rapids, MI, Sacramento, CA, and Waukegan and Libertyville,
Ill. It also provides such service to SNET customers in Connecticut. See id.
70. For example, AT&T agreed in May 1999 to acquire MediaOne, approximately the
fifth largest cable operator, for $58 billion.
71. See, e.g., Editorial, AT&T Grows Larger, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1999, at A32
(reporting that AT&T has reached agreements with Comcast and Time Warner to offer
AT&T brand local phone service over their cable networks).
72. THE ECONOMIST, William Kennard's Colosseum, May 15-21,1999, at 75.
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own facilities is irrelevant here. What is relevant is that AT&T is
making a substantial step towards entering the local exchange market
without resort to the controversial statutory provisions to which much
rhetoric and commentary have tied the prospects of local
competition.
In addition to using cable facilities to attempt to reach residential
consumers on a large scale, AT&T and MCI have been constructing
their own facilities in urban, commercial centers. AT&T is building a
network in Chicago and is collaborating with competitive access
providers in other cities. MCI is offering service entirely on its own
network-"the ability to transport traffic end-to-end over one
network"-to businesses in select markets. 3
There is no guarantee that facilities-based competitors in urban
areas will soon expand their systems to less dense neighborhoods or
that cable will succeed as the answer to true local exchange
competition for residential customers. Fiber networks that are
economical in cities may prove less so in the suburbs. The technical
hurdles to upgrading existing systems to reliable, two-way capability
are substantial and the solutions expensive. But data on current
competition and the investment being made to facilitate future
competition make clear that significant entry into the local exchange
market is taking place that does not depend on the unbundling
provisions of the 1996 Act. The Act is thus having an important
impact unrelated to the primary sources of the controversy and
litigation surrounding its implementation. This impact will only
magnify as new technologies for local exchange service-technologies
that are not dependent on existing telephone infrastructure-enter
the market. Cable telephony is the most imminent example.
Another technology currently in limited trials is fixed (as opposed to
the more familiar mobile) wireless service. Several carriers, including
major firms like AT&T, are investing in developing fixed wireless
technology that will enable them to bypass the incumbent carrier's
loops into customers' homes and businesses.74 Several carriers are
already providing such fixed wireless services to business customers in
a number of markets.75 The entry of these technologies into the local
market is dependent on the right to provide service and on
interconnection with the incumbent, but not on access to unbundled
elements of incumbent networks.
73. See On-Net Voice-Local Service (visited Sept. 27, 1999)
<www.wcom.com/services.for_business/on_net/ voice_local.shtml>.
74. See Elizabeth Clark, Pulling the Plug on the Local Loop, NETWORK, June 1, 1999.
75. See Mark Rockwell, New Fixed Wireless Players Cut in on Incumbent Telcos-
Teleport, Teligent, and WinStar Hit the Airwaves, INTERNET WEEK (Mar. 2,1998).
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B. Local Competition: The Overall Picture
Some suggest that the 1996 Act has failed in its central mission
because, on the whole, development of local competition since the
law was passed has been insignificant. One response to this
suggestion is that changes take time in markets so long structured as
regulated monopolies. Furthermore, examined in context,
developments to date in local competition are not as disappointing as
often portrayed.
Entrenched market structures do not change instantly in
response to legislative or judicial fiat. This is especially so in a
capital-intensive, partially integrated, and heavily-regulated industry
that, on top of everything else, contains a complex system of cross
subsidies that makes some market segments unattractive to new
competitors. The economics of residential local service, with its
regulated rates, geographical cross subsidies, and comparatively lower
sales of, arguably do not make pursuit of the average residential
customer a tantalizing economic prospect when there is lower-
hanging fruit in the business market.
Indeed, history indicates that rollout takes time and generally
starts, for sound economic reasons, with higher-revenue customers.
For example, carriers can generally charge businesses higher base
rates than they can charge residential customers. Business customers
will also generally generate more revenues from profitable, vertical
services like voice messaging or caller identification and from access
charges, the payments that long-distance carriers pay to local
networks for originating and terminating calls. But the costs of
providing a phone line are about the same for residential and business
customers, making the latter a source of higher profit margins.
The construction of the original Bell System itself is a lesson in
the move from commercial centers to more rural areas. And Bell was
merely repeating a strategy followed decades before by Western
Union in building out its telegraph network.76 MCI's entry into the
long-distance market similarly started with private business service,
went to public business service, and eventually to residential
offerings. The aggressive entry by competitive local carriers into the
business market, and their construction of facilities for both voice and
data, are likely to have benefits for residential customers over time.
As the most profitable customers provide the new competitors with
the revenue necessary for effective entry into the local market,
competitors will be able to expand service offerings to customers
from which they earn less return.
A second reason why current developments in local competition
76 See, e.g., TOM STANDAGE, THE VICTORIAN INTERNET 63 (1999).
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should not be dismissed is that they are comparable with relevant
historical episodes of telecommunications competition. For example,
it would take the competitive local exchange carriers about ten years
to capture half of the sixty million business lines now in service if they
continue to add lines at the current pace of about 700,000 per month,
all else remaining the same. As a comparison, it took more than a
dozen years after the 1984 divestiture for long-distance competitors to
gain a fifty percent share of market revenues, and their shares of pre-
subscribed lines and long-distance access minutes has not yet reached
that level.77 To be sure, this example leaves out residential customers.
But it is nonetheless an instructive look at the pace of competition for
profitable telecommunications customers.
For another comparison, as discussed above,78 it took fifteen
years after AT&T's patents on the telephone expired in 1893-94 for
the independent companies entering the market to carry fifty percent
of telephone traffic and to serve fifty percent of telephones.79 In the
first three years of telephone competition, from 1894 to 1896, the
independent companies' market share grew from five to nine to
twelve percent when measured by the percentage of all telephones
served.80 Over that same period, however, the number of telephones
grew by over fifty percent. To be sure, the new entrants one hundred
years ago had to build their facilities before providing service, but
they also were often entering areas that were unserved and in which
they faced no competition for customers in the rapidly growing
market. Competitors' market share since passage of the 1996 Act has
grown more slowly, but not necessarily disproportionately so
considering the much slower annual rate of line growth (about five
percent) and the fact that a competitor must woo almost every
customer it gains from an incumbent.
There are, of course, possible anticompetitive explanations for
the apparently slow overall pace of competition and for why entry has
been slower to develop in the residential local service market than in
the business market. Some point to problems with the incumbents'
compliance with the 1996 Act-the FCC has not yet found any of the
incumbent carriers to have satisfied all of the Act's market-opening
requirements. But there is good evidence that the pattern and pace
of local competition is more strongly affected by underlying economic
77. See FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, INDUSTRY ANALYSIS DMSION,
COMMON CARRIER BUREAU, TRENDS IN TELEPHONE SERVICE, at 45-46,49 (1998).
78. See supra text accompanying notes 28 to 33.
79. See HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supra note 28, at 783. These figures include
independents that did not compete head-to-head with the Bell companies, and therefore
may overstate the share independents had of competitively served markets. See id
80. See id at 784.
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factors. Because of the long institutional history of local monopoly
and the economic complexity of entry into the local residential
market, the uneven development of competition does not in itself
show that the 1996 Act's market-opening provisions are a failure or
should be changed. Indeed, the developments to date, when
considered in light of history and the underlying economics, suggest
otherwise.
C. A Note on Resale and Unbundling
In emphasizing the Act's monopoly preemption and
interconnection provisions, this essay does not mean to suggest that
the unbundling and resale provisions are unimportant. This section
briefly discusses several competitive developments resulting from
resale and unbundling, the means by which competing local carriers
are serving more than two thirds of their customer lines.
The effects of the Act's unbundling and resale requirements
appear most notably in the residential service and high-speed data
markets. As suggested earlier, because residential areas are not as
densely populated as commercial areas and tend to yield lower
telephone revenues, the residential market has proven less attractive
to new competitors than the business market.81 Entry into the local
residential market has occurred mostly through resale of the
incumbent's services. The Telecommunications Resellers Association
(TRA) represents numerous competitors, 94 percent of whose
residential business is through pure resale.82 The United States
Telephone Association, the industry association for incumbent local
carriers, reports that new entrants were reselling about 1.3 million
residential lines three years after the Act was passed.83 The FCC
made a similar estimate of 1.2 million lines.84 The FCC found that,
while competitors served 1.2 million residential lines through resale,
they served about 260,000 customers through a combination of their
own facilities and unbundled network elements leased from the
incumbents.85
Unbundling has been more critical to competitors' provision of
81. For example, Comptel, an industry association representing CLECs, recently
surveyed its members about local competition. Twelve of seventeen respondents reported
providing residential service in at least one state. Overall, of the roughly five million lines
estimated to be served by CLECs, less than one third probably belong to residential
customers.
82. See THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS RESELLERS ASSOCIATION, REPORT
SUBMITrED TO THE HOUSE COMMERCE COMMrITEE (1998).
83. See UNITED STATES TELEPHONE ASSOCIATION, LOCAL MARKET WIDE OPEN
TO COMPETITION (1998).
84. See generally LOCAL COMPETITION, supra note 51.
85. See id.
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"advanced services" like high-speed Internet access over the existing,
copper-wire, telephone plant. Numerous companies have taken
advantage of the 1996 Act to lease customer lines ("loops") and space
in the incumbents' switching centers ("collocation") in order to offer
customers digital subscriber line (DSL) service, primarily for high-
speed access to the Internet.86 DSL technology uses special modems
to transmit digital information over existing copper lines. Most of the
new data carriers are still relatively small. But competition in data
services over the telephone network shows promise as data carriers
continue to invest heavily in facilities and push DSL prices down.
Given the very high cost of building new lines to individual
customers, competitive DSL providers would not have been able to
enter the market and deployment of the service would likely have
occurred more slowly.
The above are only examples of where unbundling and resale
have altered the competitive landscape of local telecommunications.
Other uses of those entry options abound. New carriers that have
substantial networks of their own might nonetheless lease trunk lines
from the incumbent to transport traffic between switching centers. A
competitor with a fiber network that reaches a customer's offices on
one side of town may not reach the customer's other offices, and may
use unbundled elements to complete its service offerings. More
generally, unbundling and resale allow a competitor to benefit from
existing scale economies and embedded investment in providing
service, and can be used differently by different carriers depending on
the services they offer and the extent of their proprietary facilities.
There are potential downsides as well to unbundling. If the
network elements are not priced right, new entrants may have
incentive to use them even where constructing their own networks
would be more efficient. Entrants would effectively receive a subsidy
from the incumbent. Similarly, incumbents' incentives to develop
new technology and to invest in their networks will be affected by the
prices they can charge for access to their networks. A full discussion
of unbundling is well beyond the scope of this essay. For current
purposes, it suffices to say that properly designed unbundling can
perform an important transitional role in markets moving from
embedded monopoly to a more competitive structure, and that
unbundling is an important feature of competition in local exchange
markets today.
86. For a description of DSL technology, see Howard A. Shelanski, The Speed Gap:
Broadband Infrastructure and Electronic Commerce, 14 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 721, 725
(1999).
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Conclusion
This essay argues a modest point, but one that is often lost in the
controversy surrounding the Telecommunications Act of 1996: the
Act has importance for competition that transcends the difficult
unbundling and resale provisions that have dominated public
attention to the statute. To be sure, access to unbundled network
elements and the ability to resell an incumbent carrier's service are
important transitional mechanisms. But perceived difficulty with
those mechanisms should not be equated with failure of the 1996 Act.
Monopoly preemption and mandatory interconnection establish more
fundamental conditions for competition, conditions that would have
led to a very different market structure had they been in place
historically, and that are giving rise to a growing portion of the new
competition that is developing today.
